DHS IG: Readiness hampered for TSA intermodal security teams

Discussion in 'Aviation Passenger Security in the USA' started by Mike, Aug 30, 2012.

  1. Mike

    Mike Founding Member Coach

    In other words, don't let the perverts out of the airports ...

    Fierce Homeland Security: DHS IG: Readiness hampered for TSA intermodal security teams

    Being part of the Transportation Security Administration hinders the ability of teams created to secure local rail and mass-transit systems to coordinate field activities, according to a report (.pdf) from the Homeland Security Department office of inspector general.

    Challenges for TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program run the gamut of organizational, programmatic and operational issues, the IG concludes in the report, dated Aug. 15. Clarification is needed on law-enforcement activities, roles and responsibilities of team members, and equipment used during operations, the IG says.

    Other problems, according to the IG: The VIPR deployment methodology needs refinement; resources are allocated out of proportion to team workloads; training is not standardized; and the length of assignments to VIPR teams affects readiness.

    Here is a copy of the DHS OIG report (PDF 3.7MB):
  2. Mike

    Mike Founding Member Coach

    John "Pissy" Pistole's arrogance is not directly only at the American people ....

    Security Management: DHS Inspector General: VIPR Program 'Bifurcated'

    The OIG found that the operational control of VIPR field personnel and assets was split between Federal Security Directors (FSDs), who are generally responsible for passenger screening operations, and Supervisory Federal Air Marshals in Charge, (SACs) who are generally responsible for counterterrorism patrols, both of whom report to different offices within TSA. This divide, the OIG found, means that the coordination of VIPR teams relies on a good working relationship between FSDs and SACs in their geographic areas of responsibility. In some areas, the report notes, FSDs and SACs create separate VIPR operations and coordinate sparingly.

    To rectify what it considers an inefficiency, the OIG recommended that TSA give one office within the agency decision-making authority over the VIPR program to ensure FSDs and SACs are receiving and reading from the same script. TSA, however, disagreed.

    In a letter in response to the OIG review, TSA Administrator John Pistole wrote:

    "Given the designation of management responsibility and the collaborative management structure of the program organization, TSA believes its organization structure best serves the interests of internal and external stakeholders and does not intend to make additional organizational change."
    The OIG, however, did not budge from its recommendation.

    "Without additional modification, the VIPR Program will continue to operate inefficiently," the OIG warned. "Assigning decision-making authority to one TSA headquarters office to ensure that overall field operations, program activity and engagement, and oversight are coordinated effectively is prudent."

    There are other examples in the article. The OIG also recommends a PR compaign similar to "See Something, Say Something" to make VIPR's random intrusions acceptable to the American people. :td:
  3. Frank

    Frank Original Member

    If we don't have a peaceable auto de fe real soon, we're going to end up with one that's a bit more...energetic...

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