FAA Orders Review Of Boeing 787 Dreamliner

Yes, fire suppression works by removing oxygen which can be a displacement method such as bromotrifluoromethane being injected into the compartment, at least as long as nothing living will be in the area. I read a power specification for these batteries, will see if I can find it again, and the amount of power output was very high. Conventional battery systems just can't do it unless you load a truck full of heavy batteries onboard. Another thing they did was to mold the batteries to fit the compartment. Another not doable with old style batteries.

 

Pinto

 

This is more like the Chevy Volt (Mike mentioned upthread), self-imolating, no impact needed. But unsafe at any airspeed nonetheless.

 

So will Boing change the name to "BadDreamLiner" or use some new advertising "Boing,we'll fry you anywhere"

 

Good battery and one that has been used.

http://gm-volt.com/2013/01/22/boeing-787-battery-fire-update/

 

Japan eased safety standards ahead of Boeing 787 rollout
Some 40 safety rule changes in 2008 on behalf of their airlines, some specifically for the 787:

Like the one that melted in Boston?
Of course the topper was from the US:

Because the problem would be smoke, not fire. Look forward to the paper trail reporting on that genius decision.

 

FAA 's decision to let Boing do Airworthiness Certifications for the 787 instead of FAA employees seems to be a complete abdication of federal oversight responsibilities. I realize that all to often we have more government interference in our lives and business than we care for but in this case we have a completely new technology in several areas making up a new aircraft. FAA should have been right in there validating the safety of this aircraft.

 

True, and the agency was probably happy to $ave that effort, if they were even capable.
Small guys get hassled and shaken down. Big guys write their own pass. It's called "regulatory capture" and apparently a common practice in Japan too.

The game relies on trust that the big guys take care of safety. Then it's especially scary when you see the subordination of (in the case of flying-while-burning) common sense to the business decision. That isn't value engineering. It's terrible management. Why should anyone think there aren't a thousand other really bad decisions that are part of this plane?

 

I want to see what kind of structural problems a large composite aircraft has over time before I fly in one.

 

Boing asked FAA for authorization to conduct test flighs with the 787 today. No word that any systems have been changed. NTSB to release info developed to date Thursday but still researching the problem.

My read, Boing ain't got shite.

 

787 cleared to fly from Fort Worth to Boing home field tomorrow. Aircraft had been in Texas for paint.

edit to add: Little meat for the bones

http://www.nbcnews.com/business/faa-clears-boeing-one-time-787-flight-1B8278051

 

U.S. Official Faults F.A.A. for Missing 787 Battery Risk

 

Hersman lays out the simple math in B's safety risk assumption:

 

I thnk we can see why regulatory agencies (FAA) should not delegate authority to certify or accept new equipment or processes.

 

From a story called "NTSB to Question if Dreamliner Battery Adequately Tested",
after the NTSB statement, B said:

Nothing learned is right!

 

Reminded of a song from a favorite LP by Brian Eno:
Burning Airlines Give You So Much More

 

Actually wrong, but they're choosing to ignore the lesson. The battery is located in the electronics bay, which on most large aircraft is on the cargo deck level below the cockpit. For whatever silly reason, 787 pilots seem reluctant to fly a plane with a fire underfoot. They keep declaring emergencies and landing for these petty battery fires and causing bad press for poor Boeing.

 

Huffington Post: FAA followed Boeing's lead on 787 battery testing (Apr 24 2013)

Federal regulators let Boeing help write the safety conditions for the problematic battery system in its beleaguered 787 "Dreamliner," prescribe how to test it and carry out those tests itself, according to testimony and documents released at a hearing Tuesday. As airlines prepare to resume flying the 787 after a three-month grounding, the National Transportation Safety Board is looking at how the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing and the company's subcontractors tested and approved the 787's lithium ion batteries, and whether the government grants aircraft makers too much leeway when it comes to safety. Batteries aboard two 787s failed less than two weeks apart in January, causing a fire aboard one plane and smoke in another. The root cause of those incidents is still unknown.​

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Since the FAA doesn't have safety regulations for those batteries as installed equipment in planes, the agency and Boeing jointly developed the special safety conditions the plane's battery system should have to meet, according to documents and testimony. The FAA also agreed to Boeing's proposed tests for the batteries, and the company and its subcontractors were responsible for performing those tests. In one key test, a nail was driven into one of the battery's eight cells to create a short circuit. Based on the test results, Boeing concluded that a short circuit in one cell wouldn't start a fire or cause the battery's other cells to short. Yet that's exactly what NTSB investigators say happened in the battery fire in Boston, although they still don't know the origin of the short circuiting.​

 

Which is commonly called by its trade name, "Ford Exploder"